I. Introduction
The federal government undertook a massive reform of the U.S. welfare system in 1996. Named the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act", this set of reforms changed many conditions for welfare program eligibility. One major thrust of the federal reform was the introduction of time limits on the receipt of benefits under the program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) , which gives cash benefits mainly to single mothers. The federal legislation mandated at most 1 five years of lifetime benefits for a given woman, but individual states have the discretion to impose shorter time limits. As of 1998, nineteen states have imposed time limits shorter than five years. The intention 2 of these time limits is to discourage a culture of welfare dependency, either by encouraging welfare recipients to invest in human capital in order to increase future employability or by shifting the responsibility of long-term poverty toward private sources of income support such as family members and private charities.
These time limits may have unintended consequences on children younger than 18 leaving the household of their welfare-receiving parents. This incentive exists for the following reason. In the absence of time limits, a welfare mother has an economic incentive to keep her children in her household, because benefits increase with family size. For women who have reached their time limit, however, that incentive for family stability disappears: if a 17-year old child leaves the household, there is no loss of TANF benefits to the mother. In this way, time limits make children less "valuable" to welfare mothers. If the actual responses to the economic incentives are large, then the increase in family instability may lead to adverse outcomes for youths, in terms of high school completion, employment, or nonmarital childbearing.
either parent also have adverse outcomes. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) provide evidence that parent-child coresidence facilitates children's investment in human capital.
-2-An increasing body of evidence shows that welfare programs have unintended, adverse effects on family structure choices, either through marriage and divorce behavior or through childbearing decisions (Moffitt 1997) . This paper will focus on a third, lesser-noticed way in which welfare programs may affect family structure-by giving different benefit amounts to either parent or child depending on whether they coreside or live apart. As state policymakers continue to take advantage of their new discretion to redesign their welfare programs in the next several years, they will debate how best to create incentives for desirable behavior. A fuller understanding of the benefit incentives encouraging or discouraging parent-child coresidence will be useful as a guide to future reform.
The central research question of this paper is "Do welfare benefit incentives affect parents' and teenagers' decisions to coreside?" Benefit incentives for coresidence depend on more than merely the maximum benefit level, which has been the focus of most prior work. Benefit incentives are measured by (i) the benefit loss that a parent would suffer if a child leaves the household and (ii) the benefit gain that a child may receive if s/he leaves. I show first that the effects of these benefit incentives are theoretically ambiguous; unrestrictive models of intra-household and intra-family allocation yield ambiguous predictions. I then determine the empirical direction and magnitude of the response of living arrangements to these benefit incentives. Variation in the benefit incentives is provided by randomized assignment in a social experiment in California, as well as by complicated non-linearities in the welfare benefit formula.
(Tests of over-identifying restrictions are provided.)
The main empirical finding is that parent-child coresidence is more likely the greater the benefit loss that the parent would suffer if the child left the household. Thus, the new time limits may indeed have the adverse effect described above. More generally, tighter work requirements for single mothers receiving welfare benefits may also have a similar effect on living arrangements. If work requirements make welfare -3-participation undesirable for some low-income mothers, then non-participation in welfare reduces the monetary incentive for the parent and child to coreside. Indeed, some anecdotal evidence already suggests that there has been an increase in welfare payments received by grandparents taking care of grandchildren.
This trend may be due in part to single mothers finding it undesirable to satisfy the work requirements of TANF and thus shifting their children to elderly relatives-these elderly relatives would be able to collect benefits on behalf of the children but would not be subject to work requirements due to their advanced age.
If a goal of welfare policy is to keep children with their parents, then this can be achieved (at least partly) through economic incentives rather than through mandates on living arrangements.
II. Previous Literature on Parent-Child Coresidence
Most analysis of the determinants of whether young adults continue to live with their parents has been performed by demographers or sociologists (See DaVanzo (1985, 1989) and Aquilino (1990 Aquilino ( , 1991 for examples.). This literature shows that a young adult's decision to leave the parents' household is positively correlated with factors such as the presence of a stepparent, parental income, and own income. Drawing inferences about causal relationships has been difficult in this literature.
Work by economists in this area takes on several different focuses. Haurin et al. (1992) measure the impact of rental costs and wages on youths' household formation behavior. Using geographical variation in rents and wages, they find that youths are more likely to live outside their parents' homes if rents are lower or wage opportunities are higher. Wolpin (1993, 1994) analyze parentchild coresidence in the context of intergenerational transfers. Their findings suggest that parental transfers in the form of cash or coresidence play an important role in smoothing consumption for young males, including those engaged in human capital investment. For young females, AFDC benefit levels are found to slightly reduce transfers from parents. Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Hutchens et al. (1989) examine the effect of AFDC program rules on the decision of women with children to live as subfamilies within their parents' households. Ellwood and Bane find that higher welfare benefits lead to significantly lower likelihood of a single mother living as a subfamily; they use variation in benefits within states over time, as well as a second methodology that compares likely with unlikely recipients of AFDC. Using acrossstate variation in the benefit "penalty" to living as a subfamily, Hutchens et al. find a small but significant response to AFDC incentives, but they do not find a role for the AFDC benefit level itself. Whittington and Peters (1996) use panel data to estimate the effects of several economic factors on children's independence: parental income, the child's wage, the value of tax exemptions, AFDC benefit levels, housing costs, and unemployment rates. They find that the AFDC benefit level discourages young women from leaving the parental household, but no effect is found for young men.
The task of this paper is to shed light on the effect of welfare benefit incentives on household structure when the parent is the welfare recipient. This is distinct from Ellwood and Bane (1985) , Hutchens et al. (1989) , and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) who focus on child welfare recipients.
Welfare benefits depend more strongly on coresidence in the case of welfare parents and their children, thus making it perhaps more likely that one will find empirical effects than in the earlier literature. In addition, new policies such as time limits apply to the case of welfare parents, making this the more relevant population to study. The next section describes in detail the welfare incentives for coresidence between welfare parent and child.
III. Welfare Benefit Incentives for Coresidence
How does the economic environment affect the decision to coreside? There are a large number of factors that arguably have important influences on living arrangements: the geographical distribution of wage rates and job opportunities, marriage markets, housing markets, childbearing preferences, etc. In
In the empirical analysis, the potential effects of other economic factors such as housing costs, wage levels, 4 and marriage market opportunities are subsumed by geographical area indicators. The statutory value of tax exemptions does not vary within my data sample, which is a sample of welfare families in California.
The separability assumption is debatable. For instance, it rules out the possibility that one member's 5 marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure might depend on the other member's leisure.
-5-this paper, I will focus attention on the effect of welfare programs on household structure. Specifically, 4 I will examine the effects of programs that give different benefits if parent and child live apart than if they coreside. It would seem intuitively appealing to argue that an increase in welfare benefits available to either parent or child outside of the household (holding fixed the amount of benefits available under coresidence) would decrease the attractiveness of living together and hence encourage household dissolution. However, this intuition is incorrect, as will be illustrated by the following theoretical discussion.
A Model of Living Arrangements
Consider a model in which coresidence between parent and child occurs only if both parent and child prefer it to living apart. Each agent's decision depends on the maximum utility obtainable in each state, so that the choice of living arrangements depends on how income is shared between parent and child.
As a minimal assumption, suppose that consumption allocations are Pareto efficient in each living arrangement choice. Chiappori (1992) shows that this assumption yields an intuitively appealing interpretation: households behave as if they first allocate nonlabor income across household members and then individually maximize each agent's utility. This "sharing rule" interpretation holds under fairly general forms of preferences: each member's utility can be "egotistic" (depending on own consumption) or "caring" (depending on the other member's consumption in a separable way). The portion n of 5 nonlabor income that the parent receives may be affected by both parent's and child's wages or nonlabor income. Models of bargaining power may be incorporated within this framework: it is natural to expect that n under coresidence rises with the parent's potential nonlabor income when living apart.
Formally, parent's and child's indirect utility functions under coresidence can be written as where w is the wage rate, p prices of consumption goods, and y is nonlabor income, which comes exclusively from welfare benefits to the parent (B ) and to the child (B ). (I have omitted the arguments P K of the income allocation function n for simplicity.) Analogously, indirect utility when living apart is given below, where welfare benefits to the parent and child are now B +dB and B +dB , where the variables P P K K dB and dB indicate the change in welfare benefits that results from living apart.
P K
Then the parent's and child's gains to coresidence are simply G =V -V and G =V -V .
Because coresidence is chosen when both G and G are positive, we can predict the response of P K coresidence to the welfare benefit incentives dB and dB by differentiating. First consider the response P K to changes in the parent's benefit incentive, dB .
P (4)
Under reasonable bargaining scenarios, 1$dn /d(dB )$0. The non-negativity holds as long as the c,a P
In other words, the parent's benefit when living apart (B +dB ) has a greater effect on her allocated income 6 P P in that state (living apart) than in the alternative state (coresidence). This condition would obviously hold if no bargaining took place and parent and child were non-altruistic.
An alternative set of assumptions is to assume that no income sharing takes place when living apart. Then 7 the predictions are unambiguous as long as the marginal utilities of income are of the right relative magnitude.
-7-parent's welfare benefit when living apart (relative to benefits when living together) increase the parent's bargaining power and hence the share of income going to the parent. The derivative is likely to be less than unity, however, if an increase in outside opportunities has a less than one-for-one effect on the amount of income going to the parent under coresidence. The derivative in (4) is thus negative, but (3) is still ambiguously signed without further restrictions. The first additional restriction one might impose, dn /d(dB )#dn /d(dB ), places a limit on the influence of bargaining on allocations under coresidence. c a 6 P P As a second additional restriction, suppose the parent's share of income is greater when coresiding than when living apart; then the marginal utilities of income are such that dV /dy <dV /dy . This condition
is likely to be satisfied in most of the welfare families to be analyzed because dB #0, and recognizing P economies of scale in joint consumption under coresidence would strengthen this statement. Under these circumstances, dG /d(dB )#0, so one can predict that an increase in dB makes coresidence less likely.
Note that even after one assumes a bargaining framework, further assumptions are needed to obtain predictions about how coresidence should respond to the welfare benefit differential between coresidence and living apart.
7
Under a different income allocation rule, predictions may be more simple. In the absence of bargaining, the derivative dn /d(dB ) will be zero, but dn /d(dB ) will still be positive (and less than unity) c a P P if the parent makes altruistically motivated income transfers to the child. Then the derivatives in (3) and (4) are both negative: an increase in dB makes coresidence less likely.
P
Predicting the response to changes in dB is more problematic, because the derivatives dG /d(dB ) As a simplification, the notation used in this section does not explicitly incorporate the possibility that the 8 child's utility enters the parent's utility function. Adding this feature to justify altruistic transfers yields the same conclusion.
I will use the term AFDC to refer to TANF as well; these benefit calculation rules were not changed in the 9 1996 reform.
- about the response to the parent's benefit incentive are shown to hold more generally than predictions about the response to the child's benefit incentive. The empirical analysis in the rest of this paper is an effort to measure these responses, without necessarily indicating whether bargaining is an appropriate model of behavior. I will also not attempt to measure how the income sharing rule n responds to economic variables, as is done in Browning et al. (1994) . Instead, I will focus on determining how (and whether) coresidence responds to variations in dB and dB , motivated by the policy question of whether the P K structure of welfare programs induces unintended changes in household structure.
AFDC and Food Stamp Incentives
The potential welfare benefit changes dB and dB under the AFDC program are determined by P K 9 a complicated combination of the number of eligible children and whether each child has children of her Once the number of eligible children is counted, the parent is also added to the household size.
From this family size, a benefit formula is applied where the maximum monthly benefit increases with family size but at a decreasing rate. A final dimension along which benefits vary in the data sample I use is due to a randomized social experiment: a control group receives higher benefits than a treatment group.
(More description of the experiment will be given later.)
For most parent-child pairs, the variable dB will simply reflect (minus) the incremental benefit P from having one additional eligible child. This incremental benefit depends on family size: a parent with only two children suffers a greater benefit loss if one child leaves than does a parent with four or five children if one child leaves. For instance, in California, a child in a two-child AFDC family is "worth" $117 in incremental monthly AFDC benefits, while a child in a four-child family is "worth" $101. A more extreme case is one in which a particular child is the only eligible child in the family. dB will equal P (minus) the total benefit for that family, because losing that child means losing all AFDC benefits. In this extreme case, it is easy to imagine that the parent and child will choose to stay together as long as the child remains age-eligible.
Once a welfare mother reaches her time limit on welfare receipt, the value of dB falls to zero.
P Because most parent-child pairs have a large value of dB in the absence of time limits, it is feasible that P Income eligibility is unlikely to be a major problem, because I use a sample of one-time AFDC recipients 10 and their children, not a sample of the general population.
-10-time limits' effects on coresidence may be substantial. A time limit can be viewed as a policy that changes dB to zero; thus, we can apply the results from the theoretical model to show that it is ambiguous whether P time limits would encourage or discourage coresidence overall.
Finally, the Food Stamps program changes somewhat the calculation of the benefit incentives described above. Because more than three-fourths of AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps, this is potentially important to incorporate in the analysis. Food Stamps are available to households without children, and benefit levels also increase with household size. Food Stamps. In addition, I will define these measures as changes in the maximum monthly benefit, ignoring whether or not parent and child would be income-eligible. The focus of the analysis is on 10 measuring income opportunities on household structure.
IV. Data
-11-
The dataset used in this analysis is extracted from a longitudinal survey of AFDC recipients in
California. The population of families who have been in the AFDC program, while not a random segment of the overall population, is a useful group to study the incentive effects of interest in this study; families who have been on AFDC are likely to be more familiar with the benefit incentives for coresidence, and their likelihood of future welfare recipiency increases the chances that they will actually respond to the incentives. Respondents for the survey were initially drawn from the AFDC population as of December 1992, at which point they were randomized into a control or treatment group (the experiment will be described further below). A computer-aided telephone survey in English or Spanish was conducted by UCDATA of UC-Berkeley, not by the welfare agency. The survey data provide detailed information on household structure; education; marital status or cohabitation; income from earnings, welfare, and transfers; and much more. Of particular importance is that welfare mothers are asked about the whereabouts of all of their biological children and about the childbearing histories of these children (age at first birth, number of births, whether currently pregnant). The survey provides information for the family at two points in time, regardless of whether the family continued to receive AFDC. The first wave of the survey was conducted between October 1993 and September 1994, and the second wave was conducted between May 1995 and May 1996.
The data for this analysis are organized at the level of the individual child. In Wave 1, each respondent was asked to identify all biological or step-children within the household. Respondents were also asked to identify any children living outside of the household, regardless of the age of the "child." In outcomes, I have used sex and age to match children across waves; this sample consists of children who
The survey information was not detailed enough regarding children older than 19 as of Wave 1. Thus, the 11 Wave 2 sample in the regression analysis includes "children" only up to age 22.
-12-were 19 years old or younger as of the Wave 1 interview, for households that do not attrit between survey 11 waves. I omit households in which the survey respondent is not a parent of the AFDC children (for instance, a grandparent taking care of her daughter's children). Also deleted are children who are living in institutions or group homes or are living outside the home as a result of foster care arrangements, five children who die between survey waves (deleted from the Wave 2 Sample only), and six households in which inconsistencies in the child identifiers could not be resolved by visual inspection.
An important empirical regularity in the data is that children are very unlikely to live outside their mothers' households until they are around ten years old. Figure 1 presents the (weighted) proportion of children living away from their mothers by age, for the Wave 1 Sample. Because the proportion is under ten percent for children younger than 10 years old, the analysis will focus on children aged 10 and older.
(In calculating the benefit changes dB and dB , younger children still need to be accounted for.) While P K it is unlikely that 10-year old children have much discretion over their living arrangements, their parents may still respond to benefit incentives by having the children live elsewhere. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that a non-negligible fraction of these young children do in fact live away from their mothers. Children Living Outside Mothers' Homes -13-It might be argued that children under age 15 or 16 do not have much choice over their living arrangements and should thus be excluded from the analysis. However, these children's parents still have some discretion, and Figure 1 shows that more than 10 percent of children ages 10-15 end up living away from their AFDC-recipient mothers. It is thus reasonable to investigate whether such young children are on the financial margin with respect to living arrangements. Another potential problem is the inclusion of children aged 18 and older, which may give rise to a spurious correlation between welfare benefit incentives (which are very strong at age 18 or 19) and the "natural" pattern of children leaving home. In the empirical analysis, I will adopt an identification strategy which eliminates such bias. I will also present additional results that focus on the 15-18 population.
Beginning in December 1992, the state of California, under its waiver agreement with the federal government, began conducting a social experiment with its AFDC program. The main changes in the welfare system were twofold: maximum benefit levels were decreased and work incentives were increased.
A fuller description of the experiment's changes is in Appendix A. The survey dataset used in this paper was conducted on a 1,500-household subsample of the 10,000 single-parent AFDC cases in the
The final analysis sample includes only about 700 households mainly because I exclude children younger 12 than 10 years old.
This argument applies for any of the differences between control and treatment groups, whether it is the 13 benefit levels or the tax rates that are the underlying cause of changes in family structure.
-14-experiment. Summary statistics for all regression variables are presented in Table 1. Weights that adjust   12 for sampling probabilities and survey non-response are used throughout this paper.
The benefit variables dB and dB are calculated as the change in maximum monthly benefits if P K the given child leaves the mother's household, incorporating across-household variation in family size and composition. The randomized nature of the experiment introduces an additional, exogenous source of variation in dB and dB . Overall, being in the control group increases the magnitude of both dB and dB ,
because the control group has higher benefit levels as well as larger incremental benefits for additional children. In the analysis in the next section, I will use control-treatment status as an additional identifying instrument. If the experiment has effects on family structure not captured solely through dB and dB , then P K control-treatment status would be an invalid instrument. This can be checked through a standard test of 13 over-identification. 
V. Empirical Results
The discussion in section III implies that the decision to coreside will be a function of the welfare benefit gain or loss associated with living apart relative to living together. Thus, we can write a basic probit regression model as An "eligible" child is one that can be counted in the mother's welfare household, regardless of whether that 14 child currently lives in the parental household. When AFDC-only benefits are counted, this means that the child is younger than 19 but not an 18-year old female with kids of her own. (This latter female would receive her own AFDC benefits even if coresiding with her parent.) The number of eligible children is entered in the regressions as a set of dummy variables indicating 1, 2, 3, or 4 children, plus a linear variable if $5 children.
-16-where the index y $0 determines that parent and child live apart, dB #0 represents the parent's benefit it * P loss if parent and child live apart, and dB $0 is the child's benefit gain if they live apart. The covariates K X include characteristics of both parent and child, including a full set of child age dummies, child sex, it whether the child is a female with kids of her own (and the number of own kids), the total number of mother's "eligible" children , mother's age and age squared, mother's education, mother's race and 14 ethnicity (dummies for black and Hispanic), county of residence at the beginning of the experiment, and whether the interview took place between June and August (during which time children may be in temporary summer arrangements). Because multiple parent-child pairs from individual households are used, I compute standard errors that are robust to correlation across children within the same household.
The econometric identification of the coefficients " and $ deserves some comment. Variation in the benefit variables dB and dB is driven by nonlinear, interactive effects of child age, sex, childbearing, P K and control-treatment status, as outlined in section III. The regression index X ( captures the nonit interactive effects of these variables (except for control-treatment status), so a probit regression is sufficient to identify parametrically the effects of the benefit variables. However, if the underlying sources of variation in these variables have unexpectedly interactive effects on coresidence in addition to their effects through dB and dB , then estimates of " and $ may be biased. A useful strategy for investigating this P K possibility is instrumental variables (IV) with a test of over-identification. Plausible instruments include four variables: control-treatment status in the experiment; the interaction of female, age under 18, and whether she has a child of her own; the interaction of female, age under 18, and number of children of her own; and whether the child is "eligible" as part of the parent's welfare case (an interaction of variables as defined in footnote 14). I chose these four instruments because their influence on the benefit incentives
The maintained (and untestable) assumption is that the child's "eligibility" as part of the mother's AFDC 15 case, and the interaction of female, age under 18, and number of own (grand-) children are valid instruments. Recall that the control variables include age, and interactions of female and presence/number of own children. Control/treatment status is a questionable instrument because the experiment was multi-faceted. The interaction of female, age under 18, and the presence of own children may not be valid if early teen childbearing is directly related to living arrangements, but the interaction with number of own children may be more plausible as an instrument. Note that it is not strictly speaking the number of children born before age 18 that is used as an identifying instrument: daughters 18 and older with own kids typically had these kids before turning 18, but the value of the instrument is still "zero" for such daughters because of their current age.
For instance, consider a child-parent pair in which an older sibling has already left the household. My 16 measure of dB includes this older sibling, in order not to condition on the endogenous choices of other siblings. If P the older sibling is known to the parent and child to definitely stay outside of the household, then dB is mismeasured.
P
Another source of mismeasurement is the assumption that children who leave the parents live alone (plus any of their own kids); this would lead to error particularly for Food Stamps benefits.
The effects may differ over time because fewer families are still receiving AFDC in Wave 2 of the survey.
17
Recall that the sample was selected from the population of AFDC recipients as of December 1992.
Zero values and negative values for dB are dealt with because the measures I use are log(1+dB ) and -log(1- system of three equations: a probit for living arrangements, and two linear equations for dB and dB , P K respectively, with joint normality of the error terms assumed. gives no particular guidance on the functional form of dB or dB . I attempted two forms: linear and P K logarithmic. Table 2 shows results for the logarithmic specification of benefit gains or losses , because The appropriate test of over-identification in a probit model involves computing "pseudo-residuals" E(u|u$-20 X$) and E(u|u<-X$), regressing these on the instruments and exogenous variables, and comparing T times the R to 2 the appropriate P critical value. This test can be derived in a similar way to the standard Lagrange multiplier test for 2 linear IV models.
-18-a ten percent increase (in absolute value) in the parent's benefit incentive to keep the child results in as much as a 2.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of coresidence. The child's benefit gain from 19 leaving the parent has insignificant effects, perhaps because only a tiny fraction of children (less than 2 percent) stand to gain. Estimates of all coefficients from these regressions are in Appendix Table 1 .
By way of comparison, Moffitt (1997) reports that some of the highest estimates of the effect of welfare benefits on nonmarital childbearing are in the range of a 25 percent reduction in benefits reducing nonmarital childbearing by 4 or 5 percentage points (with a more "typical" estimate equal to a 0.7 percentage point effect on the probability of being a female head of household). Thus, the estimates in Table 2 suggest that welfare's effects on child-parent living arrangements easily dwarf welfare's effects on childbearing. This difference is sensible to the extent that it is easier to believe that families change their living arrangements before they change their fertility decisions.
First-stage regressions of dB and dB on the instruments and the exogenous right-hand side P K variables in X are shown in Appendix Table 2 ; the identifying instruments achieve high levels of it significance. (Inspection of these first-stage coefficients also shows that the rank condition for identification is satisfied.) The tests of over-identification (reported in Table 2 ) support the validity of the additional instruments in all cases.
20
The differences between the effects of dB and the effects of dB also suggest that who receives P K income matters. If families acted as unitary decision-makers, then a dollar increase in dB would have the P same effect as a dollar increase in dB . Because the regressions shown in Table 2 maximum benefit levels rather than actual income. Given the population in the sample, however, it is likely that maximum benefits correspond fairly closely with actual income that parent or child could receive if living apart.
-19-statistically rejected in most of these regressions, and the point estimates are quite different. This evidence against "income pooling" is consistent with work by Schultz (1990) , Thomas (1990) , and Browning et al. (1994) . Recall from section III that some parents may lose all AFDC benefits if the child leaves the household. It may be the case that the coresidence responses to dB seen in Table 2 are capturing P responses to the potential loss of all AFDC benefits rather than to potential losses of smaller amounts. To
21
The fact that the loss of all benefits has a large point estimate, above and beyond the marginal effect of dB , 22 P might be due to households' valuation of Medicaid insurance tied to AFDC receipt.
A referee suggested an additional test. A new variable defined as the ratio of dB to the total family benefit, 23 P when used in place of dB , has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Adding an indicator for whether this P ratio is equal to minus one (meaning total loss of benefits if the child leaves) eliminates significance. Including both dB and the ratio variable leaves the coefficient on dB unchanged (but insignificant), whereas the ratio variable P P becomes negative in sign (and insignificant). My interpretation of these results is that they alleviate further the concern that total loss of benefits is what drives the benefit responses, and they lend further support to the functional form chosen in equation 11.
Note also that the benefit measures are calculated under the assumption that the teenager lives alone (plus 24 any of her own kids) if not with the parent. This may overstate the extent to which teenagers would be eligible for Food Stamps benefits in particular.
-20-investigate whether this is the case, one can simply augment the basic regression model with a dummy variable indicating whether the parent would lose all AFDC benefits if the child left the household. These specifications are reported in Table 3 , with the benefit measures that incorporate only AFDC benefits. The results show that the responses to marginal changes in dB are the same as before, and the "lose all AFDC P benefits" variable is never significant. These results lend support to the interpretation that coresidence 22 is driven by marginal incentives, not just by large discontinuities based on losing AFDC eligibility. Which choice do benefit incentives affect the most? Small sample sizes prevent the estimation of a full multinomial choice model. Nevertheless, I explored whether benefit incentives affect the relative choice between two living arrangements: living with a spouse or partner versus living alone or with friends (which I shall call "living independently"). The samples for these regressions included only those children who were in the household in Wave 1, because this is the group for which complete information on destinations is available. In addition, these regressions were estimated over the sample aged 16 and older, because no younger children end up living with spouses or on their own. The regressions (available from author) show that benefit incentives do not favor moving in with a spouse or partner versus living independently, and this is true whether Food Stamps are included or not.
23
If policymakers have a particular desire to not have teenagers living independently, these results suggest two things. First, among teenagers who leave the parental household, a large fraction choose to live independently. Second, the types of benefit incentives that are readily available in the AFDC program One alternative is to specifically subsidize youths who marry relative to youths who live independently. This 25 is unlikely to be implemented, although some potential couples may have an income tax advantage that encourages marriage.
According to the 1995 Current Population Survey, 11 percent of black children younger than 18 years were 26 not living with either parent, compared to only 3 percent for white children.
Recall that the sample consists entirely of families that have been on welfare, so these results do not suggest 27 that non-poor families would have the same response to these types of incentives.
-22-can be used to discourage teenagers from leaving their parents, but not specifically to discourage living independently. Thus, the main avenue to keep teenagers from living independently is to induce them to 25 stay with their parents.
Other Results
Do the effects of welfare benefit incentives on coresidence differ across subgroups defined by race/ethnicity or mother's educational attainment? Welfare benefits might help explain racial/ethnic differentials in living arrangements, either because certain groups are more likely to be on welfare and 26 hence subject to the incentives, or because the sensitivity to the benefit incentives may differ across the population. Mother's educational attainment may be a relevant characteristic because parent-child coresidence may be a form of investment in children's education (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993) . If the time limit's incentives for coresidence affect primarily the least educated families, then the children of lesser-educated mothers may have yet another factor working against their completion of high school.
I performed regressions including interactions of dB with race and ethnicity, and also separate P regressions with interactions with mother's education. (The sample of children for whom dB is relevant K is too small to measure interactions.) None of the interaction terms were statistically significant, and the point estimates were generally quite similar across subgroups. (These results are available from the author.) Thus, I find no evidence that some demographic groups have stronger responses to benefit incentives than other groups. What is also true is that the benefit measures do not explain race/ethnic 27 -23-differentials: the main effects of being black or Hispanic do not change when benefit variables are omitted.
As discussed earlier, the sample includes children as young as 10 years old and as old as 25 years old. Skeptics of the results in Table 2 might reasonably claim that children younger than, say, 15 years old may not have much discretion over where they live (These children were included in the earlier results because the parents may still respond to benefit incentives.). Similarly, children older than 18 have no effect on AFDC benefits (They were included in Table 2 because they will always affect Food Stamp benefits.). In further analyses reported in Appendix Table 3 , I ran the same probit regressions on the subsample aged 15-18 years. The estimated effects were larger (as expected) and retained their statistical significance. Thus, the benefit effects for children outside of the 15-18 age range are less strong, but these children are still part of the population of interest. (Instrumental variable regressions, with one fewer instrument because of the age restriction, yielded much larger standard errors, so no effects were significant.)
The possibility of nonrandom survey attrition between Waves 1 and 2 is explored in Appendix B.
Briefly summarized, the appendix shows that the Wave 2 results do not appear to be biased by selectivity.
VI. Discussion and Policy Implications
This study demonstrates a previously unnoticed way in which economic incentives affect household structure decisions, broadening our knowledge of the effects of taxes or transfer programs on marriage and childbearing. Although only a few studies have found strong effects of welfare policy on childbearing, it is more reasonable to believe that financial incentives could affect living arrangements-particularly for older teenagers. It is shown that the welfare system actually encourages families to stay together in some cases, contrary to the prevalent view that welfare contributes to family dissolution. Incentives that affect the parent's desire to keep a child within the household appear to have stronger effects than incentives that affect the small fraction of children who are teenage mothers. If policymakers wish to have children younger than 18 stay with their parents to a greater extent, then the benefit schedule can be changed to increase the incentives to coreside. As a very simple example, the benefit schedule could be altered so that the incremental benefit for each additional child is larger. More generally, policymakers should recognize some policy changes as having less-than-obvious repercussions for living arrangement choices, and that these living arrangement effects can easily be stronger than effects on childbearing or marriage.
Time limits on welfare recipiency may have important family-destabilizing effects when they are viewed as changes in the incentive for the parent to keep children in the household. Children whose mothers reach the time limit become less "valuable" to their parents and are thus more likely to leave their parents. Time limits were originally intended to provide an impetus for low-income mothers to make forward-looking decisions to improve their employment prospects through human capital investment.
However, little is known about whether time limits will actually have such positive effects. This paper's results suggest that there is a potentially significant cost to balance against these unmeasured benefits of time limits.
The federal welfare reform legislation of 1996 also included a provision that requires TANF mothers younger than 18 years old to live with their parents. This mandate on living arrangements mitigates a small part of the incentive effects on coresidence. Recall that the strongest results are obtained with respect to the benefit loss that the parent would suffer if the child leaves the household-this effect operates for all children who can be counted as part of the welfare household, not just for children who are teenage mothers.
While these results show that incentives do affect household structure, it is not well established whether parent-child coresidence is beneficial when the parents are welfare recipients. While continued coresidence may allow some children to complete more schooling, it may also prolong some children's exposure to abusive parents. If a significant fraction of welfare families are "marginal" in the sense that they respond to these benefit incentives, then perhaps the child would have little to gain by staying with -25-the parent. The significant results of this study suggest that, because policy does affect living arrangements, further direct study of the consequences for child (and parent) well-being is useful to better guide policymaking.
This sample thus is disproportionately composed of long-term AFDC recipients, a group that is more likely 28 than the average person in the general population to respond to welfare benefit changes but perhaps less likely than the average AFDC entrant to respond to economic incentives. The fact that randomization was executed properly is documented in Becerra et al. (1996) .
Prior to this change, the $30 disregard applied only for the first twelve months of AFDC recipiency, and 29 the 67 percent tax rate rose to 100 percent after four months of recipiency. Thus, the change meant that welfare benefit calculations no longer depend on the length of a spell.
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Appendix A -The California Welfare Experiment
A welfare demonstration project, called the California Work Pays Demonstration Project (CWPDP), was established in four counties in California: Alameda, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and San Joaquin. These were chosen to represent a broad spectrum of the welfare caseload, including two northern counties v. two southern counties, and two counties with large urban centers v. two rural counties. The treatment and control groups were selected from a baseline caseload as of December 1992. The 28 treatment cases were subject to the new benefit rules, whereas the control cases were subject to the prereform rules (higher benefit levels and less stringent work incentives). The work incentive changes included reducing the benefit reduction rate from 100 percent to 67 percent for those recipients in spells lasting longer than four months, and extending the $30 per month income disregard past the initial twelve months of AFDC receipt. Control cases that left AFDC and subsequently returned retained their control-29 group status. The experiment instituted other changes, listed below.
C
Elimination of the 100-hour per month work limitation on AFDC-UP recipients. The 100-hour rule continues to apply for initial eligibility determination. Effective December 1992 for treatment cases.
C AFDC recipients may be exempt from participation in GAIN (Greater Avenues for Independence, California's welfare-to-work training program) if they have a child younger than three years old, but this exemption may only be used once. Applicable to treatments beginning April 1994.
C Changes in the asset limits for treatment cases: equity value of an automobile increased from $1500 to $4500, allowable resources increased from $1000 to $2000, and savings accounts up to $5000 for specialized purposes such as children's college education, down-payment on homes, or for starting a business. Effective April 1994. Old asset tests still apply at the time of eligibility determination.
C Treatment cases may elect to not receive a grant check but continue to receive only Medicaid
The need standard (NS) affects benefits in the following way. Benefits paid are equal to max [0, min{B, t×earnings}], where t is the benefit reductin rate. In many states, B and NS are identical; in California, NS>B.
-29-coverage and child care assistance. Effective May 1994.
C For treatment cases, the need standard was increased July 1993 and July 1994. This tended to 30 increase benefit payments, although payments for cases with zero income would receive only the maximum benefit.
The choice of interviewer dummies to include was determined as follows. First, I estimated an independent 31 probit determining whether a household stays in the sample, including all 19 interviewer dummies on the right-hand side. I then aggregated interviewers with similar coefficients and re-estimated the probit. I then dropped those variables that had estimated coefficients with p-values greater than 0.20 and used the remaining variables in the joint selection model. Thus, the variables included in the selection model are those indicating whether a household's Wave 1 interviewer was significantly better or worse than average.
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Appendix B -Survey Attrition
Approximately 20 percent of Wave 1 households left the survey sample between Wave 1 and Wave 2. If this attrition is related to unobservable characteristics that also affect living arrangements, then the results of probit regressions may be biased. I control for potential non-random attrition between survey waves by estimating a sample selection model, described by: Full-information maximum-likelihood results for this selection model are presented in Appendix   Table 4 . The estimated effects of dB and dB on the probability of a child living away from a parent in The use of interviewer dummies may not be valid if particular interviewers were assigned to hard-to-33 interview cases. The design of the welfare survey was such that each respondent was initially assigned an interviewer at random; interviewers could be reassigned if a case proved to be difficult to reach. However, the dataset only indicates the interviewer who completed the interview; thus, there could be a correlation between interviewer identity and the respondent's desire to undergo an interview. In order to examine this possibility, I estimated probits of the selection equation only on the sample of respondents who completed the interview the first time they were contacted. For this sample, the estimated effects of the interviewer dummies on the probability of attrition were usually very similar to the estimated magnitudes in the full sample. (The exceptions were interviewers 4 and 19, which were therefore omitted from the full selection model.) Thus, while it is less than fully desirable to include potentially endogenous interview dummies, there does not seem to be a significant problem with doing so.
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